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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an elliptic curve-based
signcryption scheme derived from the standardized signature
KCDSA (Korean Certificate-based Digital Signature Algorithm)
in the context of the Internet of Things. Our solution has
several advantages. First, the scheme is provably secure in the
random oracle model. Second, it provides the following security
properties: outsider/insider confidentiality and unforgeability;
non-repudiation and public verifiability, while being efficient
in terms of communication and computation costs. Third, the
scheme offers the certificateless feature, so certificates are not
needed to verify the user’s public keys. For illustration, we
conducted experimental evaluation based on a sensor Wismote
platform and compared the performance of the proposed scheme
to concurrent schemes.
Keywords—signcryption, security, Internet of Things, random ora-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is about the interconnection of
devices to the Internet, including smart objects and embedded
computing devices, such as: sensors, actuators, RFID tags,
smartphones or even our everyday life friendly devices (e.g.
thermostats, fridges, ovens, washing machines and TV). The
more the IoT devices are deployed, the higher is the need for
security concerns. Indeed, the IoT are generally considered as
very rich sources of data. If not protected, these data can be
abused to spy on our activities and consequently threaten our
security and privacy.
The energy consumption is a critical criteria for any secu-
rity protocol and mechanism deployed on low-cost computing
platforms used in IoT. Usually, security solutions require
expensive cryptographic operations, which consume rapidly
the energy available on resource-limited devices and therefore
reduce the life time dedicated to application.
Symmetric approaches can establish secure communica-
tions between parties with no complexity computations re-
quired. If the symmetric key is shared among all the devices,
the system security is weakened. While, if each pair of
communicating devices has its own pre-shared symmetric key,
the key bootstrapping mechanism becomes more difficult to
manage, especially in the context of IoT where the number of
connected devices composing the network is generally large.
Asymmetric approaches for secure communication establish-
ment is a good alternative since they are able to establish a se-
cure communication between two entities who do not share any
common keys. In such setting, it is important to authenticate
the public keys to avoid spoofing and masquerading attacks.
Generally, the validity of public keys is provided by means of
certificates. However, the verification and management of cer-
tificates require important computation operations, bandwidth
for communicating with remote entities and sophisticated
revocation mechanisms. The aforementioned requirements are
not appreciated for low-bandwidth and resource-constrained
environments.
In order to guarantee the unforgeability, integrity and con-
fidentiality of communications, one recommended approach is
to sign then encrypt using public key encryption. This approach
is proved to be much more costly in terms of computation and
communication complexity than the signcryption approach.
This latter, initially proposed in [3], combines simultaneously
signature and encryption. To alleviate signcryption schemes
from the issue of public key authenticity verification, Barbosa
et al. [26] proposes the notion of certificateless signcryption.
The proposed cryptographic primitive inherits the properties of
certificaless cryptography [29] which integrates the identity-
based cryptography (IBC) [30] with the public key cryp-
tography (PKC) but removes both key-escrow property in
IBC and certificates in traditional PKC. Several certificateless
signcryption schemes have been proposed in the literature [26],
[27], [25], [24]. However, they still require multiple modular
exponentiations and pairing-based operations, which may be
not practical for resource-constrained devices in the context of
IoT.
Our contribution: In this paper, we first propose a
new elliptic curve based signcryption scheme derived from
KCDSA [2], which satisfies strong security properties in
the random oracle model [36]: confidentiality against out-
sider chosen-ciphertext attacks, unforgeability against insider
chosen-message attacks. Second, we prove the security of
the proposed scheme via a sequence of games. Third, at
the extra cost of one extra point multiplication, our proposal
can achieve the insider confidentiality property. Fourth, we
show that our scheme removes the need for certificates and
still presents the best performance in comparison with related
work. Finally, we present experimental performance results of
known existing signcryption schemes based on an emulated
sensor Wismote platform and demonstrate the efficiency of
our proposed scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review security assumptions used in our
work and define the threat model for the signcryption schemes.
A. Abbreviations and Definitions
The terms and definitions used throughout the rest of this
paper are presented as follows:
• P+Q denotes the addition of two elliptic curve points
P and Q.
• [t]P denotes the addition of P with itself t times.
• s||t denotes the concatenation of two strings s and t.
• x $←− X denotes the operation of assigning to x a
randomly chosen element of X.
• ⊥ denotes the error symbol.
• lp(k) : N→ N is a function determining the length of
p, given a security parameter k.
• A PPT adversary denotes a probabilistic polynomial
time adversary.
B. Security Assumptions
1) Computational primitives: Let G be a cyclic group of
prime order p. For our purposes, G is a subgroup of points of a
suitable elliptic curve E(Fp) over finite field. P is a generator
of G. We define the following security assumptions:
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem).
Given the ”Diffie-Hellman tuples” < P, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P >,
decide whether ab ≡ c (mod p) or not.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem).
Given < P, [a]P, [b]P >, for unknown a, b ∈ Zp, compute
[ab]P .
Definition 3 (Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Problem). Given
that the DDH problem is easy in G, solve an instance of the
CDH problem < P, [a]P, [b]P >.
Definition 4 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)). Given the
two points P and Q on the elliptic curve over finite field Fp,
find d ∈ Zp so that [d]P = Q.
Definition 5 (Gap Discrete Log (GDL) Problem). Given that
the DDH problem is easy in G, solve an instance of the DLP
problem < P,Q >.
2) A signcryption scheme: We define a signcryption
scheme as a tuple of four PPT algorithms (Setup, KeyGen,
Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt) with the following functionalities:
– Setup(k) → cp. Given a security level parameter k, output
the public parameters cp. The other functions takes cp as an
implicit input.
– KeyGen(cp) → (skS , pkS), (skR, pkR). Generate pub-
lic/private pair of keys for two parties (Sender and Receiver).
– Signcrypt(skS , pkS , pkR,m) → C or ⊥. Given the pub-
lic/secret keys of the Sender, the public key of the Receiver
and a message m, return either a signcryptext C or ⊥.
– Unsigncrypt(pkS , skR, pkR, C) → m. Given the signcryp-
text C, the public/secret keys of the Receiver, the public key
of the Sender, return either a message m or ⊥.
3) One-time symmetric encryption: As earlier given in [6]
and [7], we define the one-time indistinguishability (OT-IND)
property of the symmetric key encryption (SKE).
Definition 6 (OT-IND for symmetric encryption scheme).
Let SKE = (Enc,Dec) be a bijective one-time symmetric
encryption scheme with security parameter k, A be a PPT
adversary against the security of SKE in the sense of OT-
IND. The advantage of A to win the following game must be
negligible:
– The challenger uniformly chooses at random a secret K ∈
{0, 1}l, where l is an integer calculated from k
– A is given the security parameter k. It then outputs a pair
of messages (m0,m1) of equal length and passes them to the
challenger.
– On receiving this pair, the challenger selects a bit b $←− {0, 1}
and outputs the ciphertext C = Enc(K,mb) or ⊥ if the
messages do not have equal length.
– A receives the ciphertext C and outputs b′. A wins the game
if b′ = b.
A’s advantage is defined to be AdvOT−INDA (k) = 2Pr[b′ =
b]− 1.
C. Security models for signcryption schemes
This section presents the security models for two secu-
rity notions of signcryption schemes: confidentiality against
chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), which is also known as se-
mantic security, and the unforgeability against chosen-message
attacks (CMA). We consider a multi-user setting as already
studied in [6], [9]. Concisely, there exist many other users
in addition to the attacked Sender (S) and Receiver (R). The
attacker can be either an insider or outsider that acts by re-
placing the sender/receiver public keys at will when accessing
the signcryption/unsigncryption oracles. In the outsider setting,
an attack is perpetrated by a third party which is different
from S and R. On the other hand, an attack in the insider
setting is issued from an internal party, meaning that the
attacker is a compromised S or R. In such model, the owner
of a private key is unable to retrieve any information on a
ciphertext previously signcrypted by himself without knowing
the randomness used to produce that ciphertext. Thereafter,
this paper refers to confidentiality as the confidentiality against
CCA in the outsider model, and it refers to unforgeability as
the unforgeability against CMA in the insider model.
Definition 7 (SC-IND-CCA2 [6]). Let A be a PPT adversary
against the confidentiality of a signcryption scheme between
the (fixed) sender S, and the (fixed) receiver R, with security
parameter k. A has negligible advantage to win the following
game, denoted as EXPTSC−IND−CCA2A (k):
– The challenger runs the algorithms Setup and KeyGen to
generate keying material for S and R. (skS , skR) are kept
secret while (pkS , pkR) are given to A.
– A can make calls to the signcryption and unsigncryption
oracles. On each signcryption query, A produces a pair (m,
pkB) at will where pkB is an arbitrary receiver’s public
key (that public key may differ from pkR) and m is the
message. On receiving this pair, the signcryption oracle OSC
returns the result of Signcrypt(skS , pkS , pkB ,m) to A. On
each unsigncryption query, A produces a pair (pkA, C) at
will where pkA is an arbitrary sender’s public key and C is a
signcryptext. On receiving this pair, the unsigncryption oracle
OUSC returns the result of Unsigncrypt(pkA, skR, pkR, C) to
A.
– A outputs a pair of messages of equal length (m0,
m1). On receiving this pair, the challenger selects a bit
b
$←− {0, 1} and sends the challenge ciphertext CRS =
Signcrypt(skS , pkS , pkR,mb) to A.
– A submits a number of queries to OSC and OUSC as A did
in previous steps. However, it is not allowed to query OUSC
on (pkS , CRS). Note that A can query OUSC on (pkA, CRS)
for any pkA 6= pkS and query OUSC on (pkS , C) for any
C 6= CRS .
– At the end of the game, A outputs b′ and wins the game if
b′ = b.
A’s advantage is defined to be AdvSC−IND−CCA2A (k) =
2Pr[b′ = b]− 1.
Definition 8 (SC-UF-CMA [6]). Let A be a PPT adversary
against the unforgeability of a signcryption scheme with se-
curity parameter k. A has negligible advantage to win the
following game, denoted as EXPTSC−UF−CMAA :
– The challenger runs the algorithms Setup and KeyGen to
generate a pair of public/private keys (skS , pkS) for the sender
S.
– A can make calls to OSC , but not to OUSC , because it
can generate by itself a pair of receiver’s private/public keys.
On each signcryption query, A produces a pair (m, pkB) at
will where pkB is an arbitrary receiver’s public key and m is
the message. On receiving this pair, OSC returns the result of
Signcrypt(skS , pkS , pkB ,m) to A.
– At the end of the game, A outputs a pair of receiver’s
private/public keys (skR, pkR) and a signcrypted text CRS .
We say that A wins the game if the following conditions
are satisfied: (i) CRS is a valid signcryptext from S to R
(this means that the unsigncryption process is done under the
sender’s public key pkS and the receiver’s private key skR);
(ii) A did not query on (mRS , pkR) to OSC , where mRS is
the plaintext of the signcryptext CRS .
III. OUR PROPOSED SIGN-CRYPTOSYSTEM FOR IOT
In this section, we present a lightweight signcryption
scheme based on the standardized signature KCDSA [2]. We
start by describing the architecture of our solution. Then, we
introduce our proposal in great detail. Finally, we show that
our scheme is exempted from certification requirements.
A. Architecture
The considered scenario throughout this document contains
the following actors:
• two parties: sender S and receiver R, that do not share
any pre-established credentials.
• a Key Distribution Center (KDC), who provides the
root of trust for both parties.
The KDC is in charge of providing key material for all
communicating devices. In this document, it is considered that
there is only one KDC. Applications may use multiple or
distributed KDCs and hence may need different system param-
eters (general parameters, public/private keys). The mechanism
for deciding which system parameters to use (when more than
one KDC is available) is out of scope of this paper.
The KDC first selects a secret value mk as the system
secret master key. The KDC’s public key PKKDC is then
generated from mk. This public key is the root of trust for both
parties. The KDC then provides key material for each device in
the system. The idea of key construction is inspired from works
in [1]. It defines a public validation token (PVT) to validate
the relation between the secret signing key of each device and
PKKDC . Our approach uses PVT to cryptographically bound
the device’s public key to PKKDC , instead of having a pair of
public/private keys and a certificate. The PVT does not require
any further explicit certification. KDC also attributes a short
unambiguous identifier for each device. A device identification
must be unique and can be renewed along with its key material
by the KDC. Note that the transfer of key parameters to each
device must be secure.
B. A new lightweight certificateless Diffie-Hellman based sign-
cryption scheme
This section presents our lightweight signcryption scheme
derived from the KCDSA signature scheme [2], but in the
elliptic curve setting because of its efficiency in terms of
computational cost [40]. We name our scheme SCKWC.
Setup: Depending on the security parameter k as in-
put, the KDC selects an elliptic curve E(Fp) over finite
field Fp. E(Fp) is actually defined by the set of parameters
(p, a, b,G, n, h), where p is a prime modulus, two elements
a, b specify the elliptic curve E(Fp), G is the base point, n is
the prime order of G and h is the cofactor. Further guidance on
the selection of recommended domain parameters for elliptic
curve cryptography can be found in [21]. The cryptographic
hash functions are also chosen, such that H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p,
H0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. From a chosen master key mk, the
KDC computes PKKDC = [mk]G. Each entity A is uniquely
identified with IDA. A’s public/private key pair is generated
by KDC as follows:
• Generate a public validation token PV TA = [xA]G,
where xA is a random number on Z∗p.
• Compute the private key for A: privA = (mk +
xA.H1(IDA||PV TA||G||PKKDC))−1
• Compute the public key for A: PKA = [priv−1A ]G
Signcrypt: To signcrypt a message m intended to R, S
executes the following steps:
1) Check the validity of R’s public keys, as described
in section III-C.
2) Choose randomly x $←− Z∗p.
3) Compute K = [x]PKR.
4) Generate a secret key: τ = H0(PKS ||PKR||K).
5) Compute r = H1(PKS ||PKR||K||m).
6) Compute s = privS · (x− r)mod p.
7) Compute c = Encτ (m).
8) Send (r, s, c) to R
Unsigncrypt: Upon receiving the tuple (r, s, c), R has
to perform the procedure as follows:
1) Check the validity of S’s public key, as described in
section III-C.
2) Compute W = [s]PKS + [r]G.
3) Compute K = [privR]−1W .
4) Get the secret keys: τ = H0(PKS ||PKR||K).
5) Compute Decτ (c) = m.
6) Verify that r = H1(PKS ||PKR||K||m).
Correctness: if a signcryptext (r, s, c) is
generated by a legitimate sender, then the value of
[privR]
−1W = [privR]−1.([(x−r).privS .priv−1S ]G+[r]G) =
[privR]
−1[x]G is equal to [x]PKR, which means that
r = H1(PKS ||PKR||K||m).
C. Public key validation
This section describes the algorithm to be executed in
the first step of signcryption and unsigncryption phases. Con-
cretely, it explains the process of validating the public pair
(PKI , PV TI) for any entity I. To validate these public values,
the used algorithm requires the identification of I, namely IDI
and the KDC public key PKKDC . The following checks must
be passed successfully:
• Validate that PKI and PV TI lie in the same defined
elliptic curve E.
• Compute H1(IDI ||PV TI ||G||PKKDC), as an inte-
ger number on Zp.
• Validate that PKI = PKKDC +
[H1(IDI ||PV TI ||G||PKKDC)]PV TI .
The algorithm above can be only executed at the first run of
the protocol. R and S may save the trusted public parameters
of the other party for future uses. Besides, the revocation
of I’s public values can be checked easily if the identifier
IDI is correctly generated. For instance, the identifier format
can include a timestamp in order to automatically enable the
expiration of key material. An example of how to create such
identifier can be found in [23].
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we give a formal security analysis of our
proposal. Our analysis is inspired from works conducted in
[6] and [7]. First, we define several security notions needed
for the proof. Then, we prove that the confidentiality and
unforgeability of SCKWC are tightly related to the hardness
of GDH and GDL problems.
A. Notation for the security proof
The security proof requires complex interactions between
the oracles. Hence, we use two lists L0 and L1 to keep track
of queries to and responses from the hash, signcryption and
unsigncryption oracles. Precisely, L0 contains the values of
type (PKA, PKB , W , K, τ ) ∈ G2×G2?×{0, 1}l. Likewise,
L1 contains the values of type (m, PKA, PKB , W , K,
r) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × G2 × G2? × Zp. For any set X , we defineX? = X ∪ {?}, where the symbol ? denotes the parameter
that can not be calculated by the simulation. We define O
to be a DDH oracle that is able to determine whether or
not the tuple ([a]P, [b]P, [c]P ) satisfies ab ≡ c(mod p). We
index records in the list Li by the set ILi (i = 0, 1). The
symbol ε defines an empty string. The symbol · specifies a
parameter that ”matches” any values. That is, if there exists
(x, y, ·) = (u, v, w) then we have x = u and y = v. For any
variable X calculated by a simulator, X∗ is also a simulated
value but its value is the same as the value calculated by the
real oracles. We additionally consider that qi (for i = 0, 1),
qSC , and qUSC are the maximum number of queries made to
Hi, signcryption and unsigncryption oracles, respectively.
B. Confidentiality of our scheme
Theorem 9. In the random oracle model, given a PPT
adversaryA against the SC-IND-CCA2 security of the SCKWC
signcryption scheme, there exists a PPT adversary B1 against
the GDH problem and a PPT adversary B2 against the OT-
IND property of the symmetric encryption scheme such that:






Proof: We will prove the theorem via a sequence of
games [35]. We denote Si to be the event that A outputs the
bit b′ in game Gi and b′ = b.
Game G0: This is the original attack game








Game G1: This game replaces two random oracles H0, H1 by
two random oracle simulators H0Sim and H1Sim. We maintain
the simulation of oracles by storing historical queries and
responses into the two lists L0 and L1. We first define rules
on how to determine membership in the list L0 and L1, as
described in Figure 1. Based on these rules, we simulate H0Sim
and H1Sim as denoted in Figure 2.
We observe that the simulation of H0 and H1 is modeled
as random oracles and the consistency among hash queries
is ensured by the lists L0 and L1. Besides, we assume in
this game that the signcryption and unsigncryption oracles are
perfect. As a result, we have that Game 1 is equivalent to
Game 0. Thus,
L0Rule(PKA, PKB ,K,W ) :
If (PKA, PKB , ·,K, ·) = (PKAi, PKBi,Wi,Ki, τi) or
(PKA, PKB ,W, ·, ·) = (PKAi, PKBi,Wi,Ki, τi), i ∈ IL0 then
τ
$←− τi
else if there exists (PKAi, PKBi,Wi,Ki, τi) ∈ L0 and
O(W,PKB ,Ki) = 1 or O(Wi, PKB ,K) = 1 then τ $←− τi
else τ ←⊥
return τ
L1Rule(m,PKA, PKB ,K,W ) :
If (m,PKA, PKB , ·,K, ·) = (m,PKAi, PKBi,Wi,Ki, ri) or
(m,PKA, PKB ,W, ·, ·) = (m,PKAi, PKBi,Wi,Ki, ri), i ∈ IL1 then
r
$←− ri
else if there exists (m,PKAi, PKBi,Wi,Ki, τi), i ∈ IL1 and
O(Wi, PKB ,K) = 1 or O(W,PKB ,Ki) = 1 then r $←− ri
else r ←⊥
return r
Fig. 1. Functions which determine membership in the list L0 and L1 from
partial information
H0Sim(PKA, PKB ,K) :
τ ← L0Rule(PKA, PKB ,K, null)
If τ =⊥ then τ $←− {0, 1}l; Add(PKA;PKB , ?,K, τ) to L0.
return τ
H1Sim(m,PKA, PKB ,K) :
r ← L1Rule(m,PKA, PKB ,K, null)
If r =⊥ then r $←− Zp; Add(m,PKA;PKB , ?,K, r) to L1.
return r
Fig. 2. Random Oracle Simulators H0Sim and H1Sim
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0]
Game G2: In this game, we replace the signcryption oracle
by the signcryption oracle simulator SCSim as described in
Figure 3. This simulator does not require the sender’s private
key privS to generate a signcryptext. Since s, r are uniformly
chosen at random in Zp and W is computed as W = [s]PKS+
[r]G, W is therefore uniformly distributed in G. As a result,
as long as ⊥SC does not occur, we have that Game 1 and
Game 2 are equivalent. Note that the size of Li is bounded by
(qi + qSC + qUSC) for i ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the probability that
⊥SC happens is bounded by (q1 + qSC + qUSC)/2lp(k) and
there are at most qSC executions. Hence, we have:







$←− Zp, W = [s]PKS + [r]G;
τ ← L0Rule(PKA, PKB , null,W )
If τ =⊥ then τ $←− {0, 1}l; Add (PKA, PKB ,W, ?, τ) to L0
c← Encτ (m), r′ = L1Rule(m,PKA, PKB , null,W )
If r′ 6=⊥ then return ⊥ and halt all operations (event ⊥SC )
else Add (m,PKA, PKB ,W, ?, r) to L1; C ← (r, s, c)
return C
Fig. 3. Signcryption Oracle Simulator SCSim
USCSim(PKB , (C,PKA)):
Parse C as (r, s, c)
W = [s]PKA + [r]G; τ ← L0Rule(PKA, PKB , null,W )
If τ =⊥ then τ $←− {0, 1}l; Add (PKA, PKB ,W, ?, τ) to L0
m = Decτ (c); r′ = L1Rule(m,PKA, PKB , null,W )
If r′ =⊥ then r′ $←− Zp; Add (m,PKA, PKB ,W, ?, r′) to L1 if r 6= r′
then return ⊥ else return m
Fig. 4. Unsigncryption Oracle Simulator USCSim
Game G3: This game replaces the unsigncryption oracle by
the simulator USCSim described in Figure 4, in order not to
use the receiver’s private key privR. We observe that Game
3 is identical to Game 2 except when the hash oracles are
queried at K∗ = [privR]−1([s]PKS+[r]G). We consider this
situation in three cases:
– H0 is queried on (PKS , PKR,K∗) or H1 is queried on
(m,PKS , PKR,K∗) by the adversary A. This means that A
can recover K∗. As a result, this leads to an algorithm B1 that
can solve the GDH problem, because the adversary can verify
the fact that O(PKR,W,K∗) = 1.
– The signcryption oracle could attempt to make such queries.
However, this requires that the value of W must be equal
to W ∗. Since r, s are uniformly chosen at random in Zp, the
probability that this event occurs, is bounded by the probability
qSC/2
lp(k).
– The unsigncryption oracle could attempt to make such
queries. In such situation, the adversary must have made a
query to OUSC on (c, r, s) such that: [s]PKS + [r]G =
[s∗]PKS + [r∗]G (1). If (s, r) = (s∗, r∗) then we must have
c 6= c∗, because A is not allowed to query exactly to OUSC
on the signcryptext obtained from the signcryption oracle.
We must also have τ = τ∗. Since the symmetric encryption
scheme is one-to-one, we obtain that (m = Decτ (c)) 6=
(mb = Decτ∗(c
∗)). As a result, this equation must
hold H1(PKS ||PKR||K∗||m) = H1(PKS ||PKR||K∗||mb).
However, as H1 is modeled as a random oracle, the equation
is true only with probability of 1/2lp(k). We then change
the unsigncryption oracle so that it answers ⊥ when queried
on (c, r∗, s∗). The probability that it outputs incorrectly is
bounded by qSC/2lp(k). On the other hand, if (s, r) 6= (s∗, r∗),
we show that the GDH problem can be solved. In fact, from
(1), we obtain that [(s − s∗)]PKS = [(r∗ − r)]G. We can
deduce that privS−1 = (r∗ − r)/(s − s∗). Hence, one can
compute [ab]G = [priv−1S ]PKR = [(r
∗ − r)/(s − s∗)]PKR.
At this stage, A can verify the accuracy of [ab]G by using the
DDH oracle O. Consequently, we have:
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ qS+qUSC2lp(k) +AdvGDHB1
In G3, τ∗ is not used anywhere except when computing
the challenge ciphertext c∗. Hence, if A outputs b′ = b,
then there exists an algorithm B2 that can break the OT-IND






B2 (k). Summarizing all the obtained bounds
together, we have: AdvSC−IND−CCA2A (k) = 2|Pr[S0] −
1
2 | ≤ 2qSC(q1+qSC+qUSC)2lp(k) +
2(qSC+qUSC)
2lp(k)
+ 2AdvGDHB1 (k) +
AdvOT−INDB2 (k).
C. Unforgeability of our scheme
Theorem 10. In the random oracle model, given a PPT
adversary A against the SC-UF-CMA property of the pro-
posed signcryption scheme, there exists a PPT algorithm B
against the GDL problem such that: AdvSC−UF−CMAA (k) ≤√
qR ·AdvGDLB (k) + qSC(q1+qSC)+qR+12lp(k) .
We prove the theorem using two lemmas. First, we show
that if there exists an attacker A against the SC-UF-CMA
property, we can construct an efficient algorithm B′ that solves
the GDL’ problem which is defined below. Then, we prove that
any efficient algorithm B′ can be transformed to an efficient
algorithm B that solves the GDL problem, thus contradicting
with the hardness assumption of GDL in section II-B1.
Definition 11 (GDL’ problem). Given (G,n, p, [a]P ), where
(G,n, p)
$←− Setup(k) and a $←− Zp, we define an oracle R
as follows: for i=1..qR, on input (PKi,Ki) ∈ G2, return
ri
$←− Zp, where qR is the maximum number of queries made
to R. The GDL’ problem is to compute s∗ and i∗ ∈ {1..qR}
such that: Ki∗ = [as∗ + ri∗ ]PKi∗ .
We first reduce the hardness of SC-UF-CMA property to
the hardness of the GDL’ problem as follows:
Lemma 12. If there exists a PPT adversary A against the
SC-UF-CMA property, then there exists a PPT adversary B′







Proof: We will prove the lemma via a sequence of game




∗). Let Verify be the algorithm that verifies
the two conditions listed in Definition 8. We denote Si is the
event in game Gi that Verify outputs 1.
Game G0: This is the original attack game




Game G1: This game replaces the random oracles H0 and H1
by the simulated oracles H0Sim and H1Sim. H0Sim remains
unaltered as described in Figure 2, while H1Sim is modified as
described in Figure 5. The lists L0 and L1 are still employed
to store historical queries on simulated oracles. The rules for
determining membership of these lists remain unchanged. As
we shall see, H1Sim makes call to the oracle R defined in
the GDL’ problem. Note that R behaves differently from a
random oracle, because it always returns random values even
for repeated queries. Besides, we introduce the list LR that
contains the values of type (PKB ,K, r, j) ∈ G2 × Zp × Z.
The above simulation for the random oracle H0 and H1 is
perfect. Hence, we have
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0]
Game G2: This game replaces the signcryption oracle by the
simulated oracle simulator SCSim described in Figure 3. This
simulator does not require the sender’s private key privS in
the signcryption stage.
H1Sim(m,PKA, PKB ,K) :
r ← L1Rule(m,PKA, PKB ,K, null)
If r =⊥ then j ← j + 1; r $←− R(PKB ,K); Add (PKB ,K, r, j) to LR;
Add(m,PKA;PKB , ?,K, r) to L1.
return r
Fig. 5. Random Oracle Simulators H1Sim in game G1
Since (s, r,W ) are independent and uniformly distributed
over Z2p×G, the views of attacker in Game G1 and Game G2
are equivalent, as long as the event ⊥SC does not happen. The
size of Li is bounded by (qi + qSC) for i ∈ 0, 1. Thus, the
probability that ⊥SC happens is bounded by (q1+qSC)/2lp(k).
There are maximum of qSC queries on the signcryption oracle.
Hence, we have





Now, we consider the event AskKey that H1Sim has
been queried on (m∗, PKS , PKR,K∗). Note that if AskKey
does not occur, then the value r returned by H1Sim is
uniformly generated from Zp. If C∗ is a valid signcryptext
then H1(m∗, PKS , PKR,K∗) must not have been defined
by the signcryption oracle. Thus, the probability that r =
H1(m
∗, PKS , PKR,K∗) is at most 1/2lp(k). As a result,
we obtain that Pr[S2|¬AskKey] ≤ 1/2lp(k) and consequently
Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[AskKey] + 1/2lp(k).
On the other hand, we show that if AskKey occurs, then
there exists an algorithm B′ against the GDL’ problem. In-
deed, B′ is given inputs (G,n, p, PKS) and runs A on this
input. If AskKey occurs, then A must return (PKR, r∗, s∗, c∗)
such that H1Sim is queried on (m∗, PKS , PKR,K∗). Since
(m∗, PKR) has never been queried to SCSim, R must be
queried on (PKR,K∗) by H1Sim and return r∗. Thus, there
will exist an entry (PKR,K∗, r∗, j) ∈ LR, where 1 ≤ j ≤ q1.
As a result, (s∗, j) is a valid solution for the GDL’ problem.
Therefore, we have Pr[AskKey] ≤ AdvGDL′B′ (k). In conclu-
sion, we achieve the following reduction:





In the following, we will apply the general forking lemma
defined by Bellare et al. in [8] to reduce GDL’ to GDL. This
approach is also used by Zhang et al. [7] in their proof. We
recall the general forking lemma as follows:
Lemma 13 (General forking lemma [8]). Fixing an integer
qR ≥ 1 and a set Z of size h = 2lp(k) ≥ 2. Let V be a
randomized algorithm that on input (cp, r1, r2, ..., rqR) returns
a pair (J, σ) consisting of an integer 0 ≤ J ≤ qR and a
side output σ. Let IG be a randomized algorithm that we call
input generator. The accepting probability of V , denoted as
acc, is defined as the probability that J ≥ 1 in the experiment:
cp
$←− IG; r1, r2, ..., rqR $←− Z; (J, σ) $←− V (cp, r1, r2, ..., rqR).
The forking algorithm associated to V is defined as follows:
FV(cp):
Pick coins ρ for V at random r1, ..., rqR $←− Z; (I, σ) ←
V(cp, r1, ..., rqR ; ρ); If I = 0 return (0, ε, ε); r′1, ..., r′qR
$←−
Z; (I ′, σ′)← V(cp, r1, ..., rI−1, rI , ..., rqR ; ρ)
If I = I ′ and rI 6= r′I return (1, σ, σ′) else return (0, ε, ε)
Let
frk = Pr[b = 1 : cp
$←− IG; (b, σ, σ′) $←− FV(cp)]
Then frk ≥ acc · (accqR − 1h ) and alternatively
acc ≤ qRh +
√
qR · frk
Lemma 14. If there exists a PPT adversary B′ against
the GDL’ problem, then there exists a PPT adversary B
against the GDL problem such that: AdvGDL
′
B′ (k) ≤ qRh +√
qR ·AdvGDLB (k)
Proof: We will use the general forking lemma in this
proof. As defined in the proof of Lemma 12, B′ is the
algorithm that can solve the GDL’ problem. It takes as input
(G,n, p, PKS) where a = priv−1S , and returns (j
∗, s∗, r∗) or
⊥. We denote an algorithm V that runs B′ as a subroutine.
It takes as input (G,n, p, PKS , r1, ..., rqR). It outputs values
of type (j, σ) or (0, ε, ε), where σ is a tuple of the form
(s, r) ∈ Z2p. The forking algorithm FV is built as in Lemma 13.
We define an algorithm B that runs FV as a subroutine. If FV
returns (1, σ, σ′), such that: σ = (s∗, r∗) and σ′ = (s∗′, r∗′),
we have K∗ = K∗′ and PKi∗ = PKi∗′ (because j∗ = j∗′).
As a result, the following equation holds: [priv−1S · s∗ +
rj∗ ]PKi∗ = [priv
−1
S · s∗′ + rj∗′ ]PKi∗′ . Since rj∗ 6= rj∗′
as defined in the forking algorithm FV , we can extract the
sender’s private key as follows: privS = (s∗−s∗′)/(rj∗′−rj∗).
Then B outputs privS as a solution for an instance of the GDL
problem. As we can see, V outputs essentially what B′ outputs.
It is obvious that the accepting probability acc is equal to the
success probability of B′, AdvGDL′B′ (k). Similarly, B outputs
identically as FV , so that AdvGDLB (k) = frk. Hence, by the
general forking lemma, we have:
AdvGDL
′
B′ (k) ≤ qRh +
√
qR ·AdvGDLB (k)
V. PROVIDED SECURITY FEATURES AND EXTENSION
We have formally proved in section IV that our scheme
SCKWC is confidentially secure in the outsider model and
unforgeably secure in the insider model. In [3], the authors
suggest that a signcryption scheme should also support the
”public verifiability” and ”non-repudiation” features. We claim
that SCKWC provides these properties.
Public verifiability: To prove to a trusted third party that
the sender S actually signed the plaintext m, R can forward
the following tuple (PKS , PKR,m,K, r, s, c). The third party
can verify the signcryptext by executing the steps belows:
• Compute τ = H0(PKS ||PKR||K)
• Verify if m = Decτ (c).
• Verify if r = H1(PKS ||PKR||K||m)
The knowledge on K does not leak any secrecy on the private
key of either S or R, as long as the DLP assumption remains
unbreakable for any resource-bounded attackers.
Non-repudiation: The non-repudiation is a direct result of the
unforgeability feature. The sender usually can not deny the
authority of the signcryptext when executing the above public
verifiability process, if the ciphertext is really issued by him.
However, if the aforementioned process passes successfully,
then duplicating valid signcryptext is possible, which is in-
consistent to the unforgeability feature.
It is possible to add the property of insider confidentiality
to the previous proposed scheme with the cost of an extra
point multiplication. This property was also considered in
[6], [9], [7] and called ”forward security” in several ex-
isting works [16], [13], [15]. Indeed, instead of returning
(r, s, c), Signcrypt returns (Q, s, c), where Q = [r]G. Similarly,
Unsigncrypt verifies the validity of Q instead of r, as follows:
Q
?
= [H1(PKS ||PKR||K||m)]G. As we can see, it is now
computationally infeasible for a bounded resource adversary
to recover messages of previous sessions even under exposure
of the private key of the sender due to the DLP assumption.
We name the resulting scheme as SCKWC+.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section first quantifies the performance of our pro-
posed schemes and then estimates their energy consumption
versus other related schemes on an emulated sensor platform.
A. Performance comparison
Table I illustrates the efficiency and supported security
features of our schemes and multiple signcryption proposals
in related work. The table shows if the scheme supports
certificateless property. Then, the efficiency of each scheme is
evaluated with respect to: communication and computational
costs. The communication costs are evaluated as the packet
length of signcryptext in bits. While, the computational costs
are evaluated in terms of the number of expensive operations
needed for the signcryption and unsigncryption processes.
Finally, the table summarizes the supported security properties
for each scheme.
As shown in Table I, our proposed schemes not only
support desirable security features, but also offer the best
Efficiency Supported features
Computational cost
Communication cost Signcryption Unsigncryption
Scheme CL PM PA I e EXP PM PA I e EXP UF OCF NR PV ICF StS
Zheng [3] m 2|p|+ |m| 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 l l l l m n/a
SCDSA+ [12] m 2|p|+ |m| 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 l l l l m DSA
Bao et al. [14] m 2|p|+ |m| 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 m l l l m n/a
Yum et al. [5] m 2|p|+ |m| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 m l l l m KCDSA
Selvi et al. [24] l 2|p|+ |m| 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 l l l m l n/a
S-ECSC [4] m 2|p|+ |m| 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 l l l l m n/a
ECGSC [22] m |G|+ |p|+ |m| 2 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 l l l l l ECDSA
NCLSC [28] l 3|G|+ |m| 3 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 l l l l l n/a
Tso et al. [13] m |G|+ |p|+ |m| 3 0 1 0 0 4 1 3 0 0 l l l l l ECDSA
Toorani et al. [16] m |G|+ |p|+ |m| 2 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 l l l l l n/a
Dutta et al. [15] m |G|+ |p|+ |m| 3 0 1 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 l l l l l n/a
SCKWC l 2|p|+ |m| 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 l l l l m KCDSA
SCKWC+ l |G|+ |p|+ |m| 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 l l l l l KCDSA
TABLE I. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR SCHEME AND RELATED WORK
Meaning of abbreviations: CL: Certificateless or Public key Verification without a trusted third party, PM: Point multiplication, PA: Point addition, EXP: Modular exponentiation,
I: Modular inversion, e: Pairing operation, UF: Unforgeability, OCF: Outsider Confidentiality, NF: Non-repudiation, PV: Public verifiability, ICF: Insider Confidentiality or Forward
secrecy, StS: Standard signature. We define simple symbols to evaluate the security services: l- supported, m- not supported. The n/a notation means ”not applicable”. |Y | denotes
the length of Y in bits.
performance in terms of computational cost. Indeed, SCKWC
requires only 1 point multiplications (PM) for signcryption,
3 PMs and one point addition for unsigncryption. SCKWC+
requires one more point multiplication in the signcryption
process. When compared to the other elliptic curve based
schemes ([15], [16], [13], [28], [22]), SCKWC+ needs the least
number of costly operations and also generates the shortest
signcrytext in bits.
B. Estimation of energy consumption on emulated sensor
platform
In the next subsection, we provide details on the implemen-
tation of our performance assessment. Thereafter, we report the
performance and energy consumption results of our scheme
compared with related work.
1) Experimental tools and platforms: We have imple-
mented our assessment in C for the operating system Contiki
2.7 [33]. Based on the Relic library [37] version 0.3.5, we
evaluate some cryptographic operations on the four elliptic
curves secg p160, nist p192, nist p224 and nist p256. Their
domain parameters have been recommended by SECG [38] and
NIST [21]. In addition, we opted for the emulated sensor node
Wismote to evaluate the required operations on Cooja [31]
- a Java-based simulator designed for the Contiki operating
system. Wismote [39] is a low power wireless sensor module
featured with 16 MHz MSP430x micro-controller, 16 kB of
RAM, 128 kB of ROM and an IEEE 802.15.4 radio interface.
This platform supports 20 bit addressing and sufficient RAM
and ROM capacities. Such features are necessary for using a
cryptographic library along with an application on top of it.
2) Performance: In order to assess the energy consump-
tion, we employ a software-based online energy estimation
mechanism described in [34]. In their model, the total energy
consumption can be evaluated by the following formula:
E = U ∗(Imtm+Iltl+Ittt+Irtr+
∑
Icitci), where U is the
supply voltage, Ii and ti (i = m, l, t, r) are the current draw
and the time duration of the microprocessor in active mode,
low power mode, transmit mode and receive mode respectively.
Ici and tci are the current draw and the time duration of the
microprocessor for handling other components, such as sensors
and LEDs.
In our scenario, we consider only the first four factors. The
value of U is typically 3V, as with two new AA batteries.
Furthermore, the current draw of the sensor node in each
mode is extracted from its data sheet. As an example, the
Wismote platform consumes I=2.2mA when in active mode.
The time ti that the component is in mode i, is measured
by Powertrace. The latter is a pre-loaded tool in the Contiki
OS, which provides an accuracy up to 94% of the energy
consumption of a device [32].
Table II shows the execution time and energy cost of
ECC operations over the Wismote platform. We consider only
the most expensive operations: point multiplication(PM), point
addition(PA), modular inversion and pairing operation. Each
operation is evaluated in the four mentioned elliptic curves in
increasing order of security level. Pairing-based calculation is,
as expected, the most expensive operation. Point multiplication
is also an expensive task. That is, even for the smallest security
level of 80 bits, it requires up to 2.5s to compute and consumes
16.25mJ. In addition, we observe that for an elliptic curve
with length of 256 bits of field order, the energy cost for point
multiplications and pairing operations becomes huge, since for
a single execution, they consume more than 124mJ and 239mJ,
respectively. Besides, they are also time-consuming (18.91s for
a PM and 36.16s for a pairing).
Fig. 6. Total estimated energy consumption of our schemes and related work
Gathering the measurement results in Table I and II,
we estimate the total energy consumption of our proposed
signcryption schemes and five other ECC-based signcryption
schemes. As depicted in Figure 6, our proposals SCKWC and
SCKWC+ are the most efficient schemes. The ECGSC [22]
scheme has a slightly higher computational cost in compar-
ison with ours. However, it requires certificates to validate
the public keys. This constraint could be very costly for a
sensor node, since the verification of certificates is usually
Parameters Strength Size PM PA Inversion Pairing
secg p160 80 160 2460ms/16.25mJ 7ms/0.03mJ 298ms/1.90mJ 3533ms/23.32mJ
nist p192 96 192 3463ms/22.53mJ 8ms/0.04mJ 403ms/2.67mJ 6586ms/43.47mJ
nist p224 112 224 4782ms/32.05mJ 10ms/0.07mJ 577ms/3.81mJ 9573ms/63.19mJ
nist p256 128 256 18.91s/124.07mJ 31ms/0.21mJ 1870ms/12.36mJ 36,16s/238.13mJ
TABLE II. ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND TIME EXECUTION OF ATOMIC OPERATIONS ON WISEMOTE
complicated and consuming in energy. Indeed, SCKWC+ saves
more than 17%, 31%, 38% and 41% of the overall energy
consumption in comparison with the schemes of Dutta et al.
[15], Tso et al. [13], Toorani et al. [16] and NCLSC [28],
respectively. SCKWC is even more efficient than SCKWC+
and therefore can be applied on resource-constrained devices.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this paper, we are mainly interested in the signcryption
schemes based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. As surveyed
in [17], there exist several schemes based on different se-
curity assumptions, such as: Bilinear Maps [18] and RSA
problem [19]. Most of the signcryption schemes are derived
from popular signature schemes. Zheng’s scheme [3] is based
on Elgamal encryption and signature [20], which is com-
putationally efficient, but requires complex interactive zero-
knowledge proof to validate the non-repudiation and does not
provide insider confidentiality. Bao et al. [14] modify Zheng’s
proposal to provide the public verifiability property without
the need for the recipient’s private key. However, the previous
scheme is not semantically secure, as written by Shin et al.
[12]. They claim their new signcryption proposal based on
DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) [21], namely SCDSA+,
to be confidentially and unforgeably secure, without giving a
formal proof. There exist also several schemes issued from
the standardized signature algorithm ECDSA [22], [13]. Both
schemes provide desirable security properties as depicted in
Table I but still result in poorer performance than our schemes.
Certificateless signcryption schemes remove the use of certifi-
cates. However, they usually require costly pairing operations
for public key validation [26], [27]. Some similar proposals are
successful to remove pairing operations in their construction
[25], [24]. However, they still require 10 and 12 modular
exponentiations.
Two signcryption variants of KCDSA are first proposed
by Yum et al. [5]. However, their security has not been
formally proved by the authors. Besides, the first variant is
confidentially insecure in the insider model. The second one is
not semantically secure due to the disclosure on the hash of the
message, in addition to being more expensive in terms of per-
formance comparing to our first proposal SCKWC (one extra
exponentiation). Several works on identity-based signcryption
scheme based on KCDSA exist, such as [10], [11]. Though,
these schemes require 3 costly pairing operations, which is not
practical for constrained nodes in the IoT.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed two lightweight signcryption schemes
derived from the standardized signature KCDSA that do not
require the use of certificates. The first proposal SCKWC has
been formally proved to be outsider confidentially and insider
unforgeablely secure against chosen ciphertext/message attacks
in the random oracle model. The second variant is secure in
the insider model but requires one more point multiplication.
Furthermore, our schemes offer efficiency both in terms of
communication and energy consumption costs. The efficiency
of the proposed schemes has been validated by an experimental
evaluation on an emulated sensor platform. As future work,
we plan to integrate the proposed signcryption schemes into a
security framework designed for the IoT.
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